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WHY ATTACK CULTURE?
Existence of a separate safety organization establishes an “us and them” 
perspective
Aircrew and maintainers are mission oriented
 Process may not be as important until it impacts them directly
 Safety is viewed a competing interest or commodity.
Other factors compete for their attention
 Fiscal resources 
 Available schedule
 Organizational reputation (definition of success, success oriented, flexible, 
independence, etc…) 
 Personal risk acceptance level
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WHY ATTACK CULTURE?
 Individual perception of value is greatly influence by our group culture
 Trusted to do the right thing
 Valued for doing the right thing and contributing - belonging
 My view of our world is correct and it matters – how do I reconcile the 
differences
Culture is the lens through which the operators see process
Change the lens and you change the value system in the process
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NASA AVIATION CULTURE 
ASSESSMENT  HISTORY
Brought in an independent contractor
 Provides for a high level of confidence in the anonymity of the results
 Keeps certain results from higher managers
 Leverage the use of a survey that has been accepted across the larger aviation community  -
Human Factors Associates
Challenges
 Interpretation of questions (language)
 Sharing of Center’s results outside their operations may be seen as detrimental
 Verbiage may need to be adjusted make the question valid within an organization  (agency, 
center, work center)
• Does the changed question need revalidation
• Can it still be combined with other organizations results  (research objective)
 Can the organization handle another survey- measuring their willingness to take the survey
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NASA AVIATION CULTURE 
ASSESSMENT  HISTORY
Two tools used to understand the health of the organization
Organizational Safety Effectiveness Survey )OSES) – how do individuals see 
the organization’s effectiveness at implementing a safety mindset
Culture survey – measures the organization’s shared valued of an effective 
safety environment
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FLIGHT CENTER ANALYSIS
ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY EFFECTIVESS SURVEY
 A culture of trust, shared values, and risk mitigating 
communication processes.
 Communication that provides opportunities for open discussion 
and improvement.
 Distributed decision-making, “where the buck stops everywhere.”
 (Roberts, 1997)
GOAL:  HIGH - RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION (HRO)
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WHAT ARE WE REALLY MEASURING?
Culture – the relatively permanent values, beliefs, and 
motivation shared by leaders, stakeholders, and the  
organization’s members that drive performance and safe 
practices.
Climate – snapshot of employee’s shared perception of 
management’s commitment to safety,  and the support 
needed to ensure that resources, standard practices, training 
and other processes are in place and working. 
Survey is not the desired outcome – tool to help find the 
starting point for change and measure the success of change
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NASA AVIATION OSES
Assessment Areas
• Safety Climate – Culture
• Safety Supervision 
• Organizational Factors
• Safety Communications
• Workload and Fatigue
• Maintenance 
Brief Definition
• Employees share common beliefs and values 
about safety and reliably follow best practices.
• Safety personnel communicate and promote 
active safety participation, and lead by 
example.
• Leadership sets policies, resources safety and 
promotes open reporting of safety issues.
• Safety personnel ensure that employees get 
updated and relevant safety critical information 
• Management provides adequate staff levels 
and   control  daily work routines to avoid 
fatigue.
• Maintenance operations work “by the book”, 
and carefully manage training, inspections, and 
shift work practices.
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(Ciavarelli, 2016) 
NASA AVIATION OSES
Assessment Areas
• Safety Climate – Culture
• Safety Supervision
• Organizational Factors
• Safety Communications
• Workload and Fatigue
• Maintenance Specific 
Sample Survey Item
• All employees feel free to report errors 
without fear of retribution.
• My supervisor sets the example for 
compliance with standard procedures.
• My work area has an excellent 
reputation for high-quality work.
• I get all the information that I need to 
perform my job safely.
• I seldom feel overburdened by my 
daily work assignments.
• The Center... has an adequate supply 
of aircraft mechanics.
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(Ciavarelli, 2016) 
SURVEY RETURN RATES
Center 2009 2011 2013 2015
Ames 44% 55.6%
Armstrong 49.6% 38% 55.6%       69.2%
Glenn 75% 87.0%
Johnson 54% 42.5%
Kennedy 71% 47.6%
Langley 56% 86.7%
Wallops 70% 64.9%
OVERALL 48% 57.2%
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2011 Survey Result
(Ciavarelli, 2016) 
NORMALIZED PERCENT AGREEMENT COMPARISONS (1-5 
SCALE)
Scale (1-5) 2009 2011 2013 2015
% Surveyed
1. (low)
2.
Unfavorable
3. (neutral)
4.
5. (high)
Favorable
50
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11.0%
13.4%
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32.8%
74.7%
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ITEMS AT OR ABOVE MEAN OF 4.0
1. I believe that my Center’s Aircraft Operations has an effective safety 
reporting process. 
2. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization provides adequate 
procedures to prevent injuries.
3. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization provides adequate 
resources for preventing personal injury or damage to equipment at our 
facility.
9. My Supervisor is actively involved in my Center’s Aircraft Operations 
Organization NASA Flight Operations safety programs.
10. Working safely is an integral part of all operations within my Center’s 
Aircraft Operations Organization.
13. My Center’s Aircraft Operations  Organization supports a climate that 
promotes safety.
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ITEMS AT OR ABOVE MEAN OF 4.0
14. My Supervisor encourages my work area to follow required 
procedures.
15. Any employee in my work area can request stopping or 
delaying an operation if he/she believes that an unsafe condition 
exists.
16.  I am comfortable admitting to my Supervisor that I have made 
a mistake.
17*. It would be difficult for me to ask my Supervisor for more time 
to complete a task. 
18. There is genuine commitment to safe work practices in my 
Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization.
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ITEMS AT OR BELOW 3.0 MEAN
67*. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization will likely face a 
critical pilot shortage in the near future, due to impending 
retirements and natural attrition. 
78. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization has an effective 
process in place to mitigate any risk due to an aging workforce. 
80*. Some aspects of safety oversight are overdone and hinder 
work progress. 
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NORMATIVE COMPARISON ACROSS DOMAINS
Comparison % Problematic % Favorable
Aerospace 7.97% 79.67%
Air Medical 14.98% 79.12%
General Aviation – Ground 14.42% 73.86%
Oil and Gas transport 19.22% 64.24%
Medical Facility – ICU 7.11% 77.57%
Electric Power Utility 11.46% 72.95%
Air Traffic Control (2006) 50.35% 38.83%
NASA Flight Centers 2009 5.54% 86.16%
NASA Flight Centers 2011 11.4% 75.5%
Dryden Center 2009 11.04% 74.6%
Dryden Center 2011 14..1% 69.9%
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ITEMS WITH MEAN AT OR BELOW 3.0
38* -- Center Flight Operations does 
not provide adequate staffing at my 
location.
67* -- Center Flight Operations will 
likely face a pilot shortage
76 – Center has ample supply of pilots 
for aircraft flown now
77* – Center has not adequately 
prepared employees for change
80* -- Some aspects of safety are 
overdone/hinder work progress
75 – Substantial increase in workload 
might lead errors
78 – NASA has risk mitigation 
procedure for aging pilot population
67*. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization 
will likely face a critical pilot shortage in the near 
future, due to impending retirements and natural 
attrition. 
78. My Center’s Aircraft Operations Organization 
has an effective process in place to mitigate any 
risk due to an aging workforce. 
80*. Some aspects of safety oversight are overdone 
and hinder work progress. 
2009 Survey 2011 Survey
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
As shown most of the “negativity” concerns 
high workload conditions and a perceived 
inadequacy in staffing levels. 
So, it is not surprising that ratings of the 
assessment Area – Organizational 
Effectiveness are affected: Items rated near or 
below 50% are:
 Item 24 – Employee Morale
 Item 26 – Organizational Change Management
 Item 29 – Communications up/down organization
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 22
CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions 
 Safety program effectiveness are mainly positive.
 Staffing, resources, scheduling and personnel workload show a 
negative trend.
Recommendations
 Share the results of the survey with all personnel in a 
timely manner.
 Establish dialogue with management and workers on key 
organizational and workload issues – Verify nature of a 
problem and find the root cause 
 Take a concrete action
 Followup with reassessment and communicate result
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MEASURED ONE ASPECT OF 
UNDERSTAFFING
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RECOMMENDED ACTION
• Develop and implement a specific strategy to reduce the Center’s use of 
overtime eliminate all personnel working an average of 9 hours of overtime 
and reduce personnel working 6-9 average hours of overtime per pay period 
for any person by 50%.
• Eliminating uncompensated overtime.
• Reducing the number of RDO days with flight activity in FY16 by 20% of the 
average employed in FY14(21) and FY15(10).  Target is 12. 
• Initiate process improvements to improve mission throughput by 15 percent 
in one area where understaffing is critical. 
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Miriam Rodon-Naveira
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FIVE COMPONENTS OF A 
HEALTHY SAFETY CULTURE
Reporting Culture (RC):  We report our concerns.  Identification of 
hazards or safety concerns is encouraged, including a system that’s easy to 
use. The reporting system maintains anonymity and is separate from the 
disciplinary processes. Useful feedback based on reporting is quick and 
insightful.  An atmosphere of trust exists between managers and workers, with 
employees knowing important information will be voiced, heard, and acted 
on appropriately.
Flexible Culture (FC): We change to meet new demands.  The 
organization effectively balances and adapts to changing demands while 
managing complex technologies and maintaining productivity.  A healthy 
flexible culture uses safety data to make meaningful changes when there’s a 
concerning trend or issue.
Adapted from Reason, Weigmann, and Zhang & Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), Safety Working GroupNational Aeronautics and Space Administration
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FIVE COMPONENTS OF A 
HEALTHY SAFETY CULTURE
Learning Culture (LC) :  We learn from our successes and 
mistakes.  Collecting, assessing, and sharing from experience is a 
priority.  Information is available to everyone from novice to expert.  
Values and commits to proactively “learn from our mistakes”, both 
formally and informally. 
Engaged Culture (EC):  Everyone does their part.  All 
members regardless of status or occupation are involved and actively 
participate in safely accomplishing the mission.  The key is to have 
leaders and employees who demonstrate they value safety by 
“walking the talk.”                            
Adapted from Reason, Weigmann, and Zhang & Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), Safety Working GroupNational Aeronautics and Space Administration
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FIVE COMPONENTS OF A 
HEALTHY SAFETY CULTURE
Just Culture (JC):  We have a sense of fairness.  Balances the need for 
discipline when warranted, with rewards when earned.  People are held 
accountable for deliberate violations of rules and recognized for outstanding 
performance. There’s a clear understanding of acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviors.  There’s a sense of fairness about how business is 
conducted. where people aren’t punished for reporting and aren’t afraid of 
reprisal if they do.
Resistance Factors
Personal performance
Adapted from Reason, Weigmann, and Zhang & Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), Safety Working GroupNational Aeronautics and Space Administration
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Summary Overall  Distribution of Results 
Graph Of Mean For Dryden  Responses Compared With Mean And Standard Deviation with respect to All Agency 
Respondents  
Armstrong responses are below most of  the overall Agency 
respondents. We also have three Red Flags:
8- Appropriate Action is taken if safety rules are violated (JC)
16- My Center uses safety information from past experiences in 
future decision making (LC)
19 – Leaders demonstrate they value safety by “walking the talk” 
(EC)
2014- Armstrong Survey compared to Agency
Legend
Lines and Flags:  
( black dot  ) Mean for all respondents   
(Yellow flag) Mean is less than Agency mean 
but      within one-half standard deviation  
(Red flag)   Mean is more than one-half 
standard deviation below the Agency mean
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DEMOGRAPHICS 
RESULTS
Respondents
Survey 2014 --- 493 of 1307 Requested Surveys Completed =  37.7% Participation
50.0% of the Civil Servants workforce responded
28.3% of the Contractor workforce responded
Good turn-out from most  organizations
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/wEPDwUdAAKWButton
Mean scores by Category for Dryden (brighter, foreground bars) vs. The Agency (darker, background bars)    
Armstrong Respondents vs. Agency Respondents
Comparison of Likert Results to 
Agency    Survey 2011 and Survey 
2014
Armstrong follows the same pattern of responses as the overall 
Agency, just lower. The overall Agency increased the “satisfaction” 
in almost every factor, while Armstrong decreased, except in the 
Reporting Factor.  
2011
2014
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SAFETY DAY
Annual event to focus on promoting a positive Safety Culture across the 
Center
 Time to stop and think  (this one should be mandatory-boss must be there)
Led by Safety Organization
 Team has participants from all Center organizations
 Presentations focus on personal safety not necessarily job related
 Afternoon reserved for individual organization sessions to focus on job-related 
safety topics
 Coincides with the Safety Culture Survey
 Includes a feedback 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 33
LESSONS LEARNED
Choose survey dates to allow for good response
 Current workload & last survey (distraction from job)
Third Party vendor enhances
 Accessibility  (outside the work firewall)
 Anonymity
Pick one thing to correct and make it happen 
 Involve employees in the solution and implementation
 Design it around a tangible goal/result
 Result will be multi-dimensional impacting several cultural areas
Continual Improvement (improved mishap rate) is the goal (not the survey result)
 Communicate  progress and the intermediate steps
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